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Human capital theory has long recognized that men and women earn many returns to their 
investments in schooling, including the effect that schooling has on marital outcomes. Yet, 
almost all of the empirical literature on returns to schooling focuses on the relationship between 
schooling and individual labor market earnings. In this paper, I try to fill this gap by estimating 
the extent to which US men and women are currently earning their returns to schooling through 
improved marital outcomes.  
To answer this question, I formulate a collective household model (Chiappori 1988) which is 
embedded within the matching framework of Crawford and Knoer (1981). The model is 
estimated with US data on the relationship between schooling and wage rates, the division of 
time within the household, and the extent to which men and women sort positively on several 
traits in marriage. I then use the model to quantify how schooling affects the material resources 
that men and women can acquire through marriage. The results indicate that middle aged US 
men and women are currently earning in the order of 30 percent of their return to schooling 
through marriage.  
One important motivation for quantifying marriage returns to schooling is to understand the 
demand for schooling of both men and women. In many countries such as the US, women are 
devoting more and more time to schooling and now surpass men in terms of their educational 
attainment (see for example Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 1996). At the same time, the 
participation rate of women in the labor force is much lower than the corresponding rate for men. 
This suggests that other than labor market returns play a role when men and women make their 
schooling decisions (see Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss 2009 for an in-depth analysis). 
A second motivation for estimating marriage returns to schooling is to understand the 
transmission of economic status across generations and how it is affected by parental choices. In 
particular, leading theories of intergenerational mobility such as that of Becker and Tomes 
(1986), emphasize how parents make investments in the human capital of their children which 
affect both their labor market and marriage market outcomes.  Recent empirical evidence 
suggests that the marital effect is important as a significant fraction of the covariance between 3 
 
parent and child family income is generated through assortative mating (Ermisch, Francesconi, 
and Siedler 2006).     
An early reference to marriage returns to schooling can be found in Becker (1960) who points 
out that “a woman receives indirect returns from college if it enables her to marry a man with a 
higher income than she would have married if she did not go to college”. Much of the following 
theoretical literature on marriage returns to schooling has focused on whether the presence of 
such returns leads to a hold-up problem, as many of the resources that men and women bring to 
marriage are public goods (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001, Peters and Siow 2002, and 
Iyigun and Walsh 2007). A second line of theoretical research has investigated how the sexual 
division of labor in marriage may coordinate male and female human capital investments prior to 
marriage (Hadfield 1999, and Baker and Jacobsen 2007).  
The empirical literature on marriage returns to schooling is very small. Most likely, this is due to 
the difficulties involved in constructing a welfare measure for married men and women. One 
possible approach is to assume that men and women split their total household earnings in half, 
and use their respective shares to finance the consumption of a private good. Such a measure has 
been used by Goldin (1992), and Lefgren and McIntyre (2006) who both estimate that US 
women have been earning about 50% of their total returns to schooling through marriage. 
A potential problem with a consumption measure based on household earnings is that it treats 
marriage as a zero sum game (every dollar gained by the wife is a dollar lost for the husband and 
vice versa). The easiest way to illustrate the problem is to consider how the consumption 
measure is applied to the household member with the highest earnings. If that household member 
remains single, he or she is assigned a consumption level equal to his or her entire earnings, 
whereas when married, he or she shares some of these earnings with a spouse without receiving 
anything in return. In that sense, marriage constitutes a loss to him or her. 
To avoid such problems, I base the empirical work in this paper on the premise that marriage 
generates a surplus. In the household model that is estimated, men and women benefit from 
marriage due to consumption savings, the presence of public goods, and since household 
members can specialize towards market or housework. A consequence of this empirical strategy, 
is that marriage returns to schooling can be defined and estimated for both men and women in a 4 
 
perfectly symmetric way (the two empirical papers mentioned above only estimate marriage 
returns to schooling for women).  
From a methodological point of view, this paper is part of a recent literature that tries to place the 
collective model of household behavior (Chiappori 1988) within the context of a general 
equilibrium marriage matching model. A similar approach is taken by Choo, Seitz, and Siow 
(2008), who integrate the marriage model of Choo and Siow (2006) with the collective model.  
Choo, Seitz and Siow focus on developing a general marriage model that is tractable and can be 
estimated without computing stable marriage matchings. Such tractability is achieved by placing 
restrictions on the error terms of the matching model. A main result from their paper, is that the 
sharing of resources in marriage can be estimated not only with data on the labor supplies of 
husbands and wives, but also with data on who marries whom across a set of isolated marriage 
markets. In contrast, this paper uses a marriage matching model to address the quantitative issue 
of marriage market returns to schooling. The structure of the model economy is less restrictive as 
men and women do not have to be divided into discrete groups.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 below, I present the model that is 
estimated in this paper, and the key properties of the model equilibrium. In section 3, I describe 
the data used for the analysis, and section 4 discusses the issue of identification. Section 5 
presents the estimation method used, and section 6 the main results together with a number of 
robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes with a discussion of the main results of the paper. 
 
II. Model 
A. Basic setup of model 
The economy is static and populated by   men (indexed by      1,2,…, ), and   women 
(indexed by     1,2,…, ). Men and women have the choice of remaining single, or marrying a 
member of the opposite sex. All agents are characterized by their years of schooling  , their non-
labor income  , their wage rate  , and a vector of additional characteristics that are specified 
below. 5 
 
Men and women derive utility from the consumption of a private consumption good  , leisure  , 
and a public household good  . Both men and women rank bundles of these commodities 
according to the Stone-Geary utility function 
   , ,     ·                ·                 1      ·               
Furthermore, agents have a unit time endowment which can be used for leisure, housework  , 
and market work 1    . I normalize the price of the market good for single agents to one, 
which implies that the budget constraint for a single agent is 
     · 1      
In real life, a married couple can obtain more consumption services from a given amount of 
income, than if the two household members had lived apart as singles. I capture these effects in 
the model, by letting married agents face a price   for the private consumption good that is lower 
than the price which single agents face. With subscripts   and   for husbands and wives 
respectively, the budget constraint for a married couple can then be written as 
 ·                          ·  1              ·  1           
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B. Wages 
The wages of men and women are modeled with standard Mincer equations. The log hourly 
wage of an agent depends on his or her years of schooling, experience, experience squared, IQ, 
and social background  . In the empirical implementation, I use AFQT scores as a proxy for IQ 
and treat the social background variable as a single factor that is estimated from measurements 




 Given these assumptions, the log hourly wage for man   is thus given by  
      
       
      
  ·        
  ·            
  ·      2       
  ·          
  ·        
   
and the log hourly wage for woman   is given by  
      
      
      
  ·        
  ·            
  ·      2     
  ·          
  ·        
  
In these equations, the wage error terms    and    are independent across agents, independent of 
all the personal characteristics of an agent, and have normal distributions 
  ~  0,  , 
          ,             ,          
 
C. Household technology 
The public household good   is produced with the housework inputs of the household members. 
I assume that the effective amount of human capital that each agent has available for housework 
grows exponentially with his or her years of schooling, IQ, and social background. For IQ and 
social background, I calibrate the model so that these two traits raise the productivity of men and 
women in housework at the same rate as they raise male and female labor market wages. For 
years of schooling, I use the same baseline calibration rule, but also consider specifications in 
which the effect of schooling on housework productivity is lower (see section 6 for more details).  
More formally, I define the log of the effective amount of human capital of man   as  
      
     ·        
  ·          
  ·        
   
and the log of the effective amount of human capital of woman   as 
       
    ·        
  ·          
  ·        
  
Furthermore, an agent who is in a given percentile of the distribution of market wages 
conditional on his or her observable characteristics, is assumed to be in the same percentile of the 
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for some parameter   0 . 
To quantify the outcomes of the household production process, I use a linear production function 
for single agents  
      ·              
and a CES production function for married agents 




     ,     1 
I choose such a specification for three different reasons. First, the production functions for both 
single and married agents are constant returns to scale. Second, the CES functional form is 
flexible enough to capture any degree of substitutability between male and female housework. 
And third, the joint specification implies that a married couple in which only one of the 
household members devotes time to housework, produces the same quantity of the household 
good as that household member would have produced, had he or she lived alone as a single agent.  
With a CES production function, the parameter   which determines the elasticity of substitution 
between male and female housework, also determines the extent to which the two inputs are 
direct complements. Since the household production functions will be estimated from data on 
housework inputs, a potential concern is that the results of the analysis depend strongly on the 
particular functional forms chosen. To minimize these concerns, I therefore perform robustness 
checks in which I modify the household production function. Overall, these modifications have a 
very small effect on the estimated share of marriage returns to schooling, which suggests that 





D. Single households 
Agents who are single obtain utility through the consumption of the market good, leisure, and the 
household good. Formally, single agents choose their market work, leisure and housework to 
maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint, household technology constraint, and 
time constraints. If     is the utility obtained by a single agent, then this utility can be written as 
(S)           , ,    m a x        , ,   
 s.t)       · 1       
      ·            
0   1           1,       1,       1 
 
E. Married couples 
Following the collective household literature
1, I assume that allocations for married agents are 
efficient and use the labor supply and leisure of men and women as indicators of how couples 
share their resources. If     and    are the utilities that a husband and a wife obtain from the 
consumption of the market good, leisure, and the household good only, then by definition, these 
two utilities satisfy 
(P)      m a x         ,   ,   
s.t)            ,   ,       
                         1              1            




      
0 1            1              ,  





In addition to the utility obtained from the consumption of commodities, married agents also 
obtain utility from the match with their spouse. I let     and     denote the total utility for men 
and women in marriage, and define this total utility as the sum of the utility obtained from the 
consumption of commodities, and the marriage match utility.  
In detail, the total utility V 
 ,  that man   obtains if he marries woman   and receives utility 
  
 ,  from the consumption of commodities, is   
V 
 ,      
 ,       ·    ·          ·      ·           ·    ·        
   
By analogy, the total utility V  
 ,  that woman   obtains if she marries man   and receives utility 
  
 ,  from the consumption of commodities, is 
V  
 ,      
 ,       ·    ·          ·      ·           ·    ·        
  
In these equations,   ,    ,    are parameters that contribute to the complementarities of the 
years of schooling, IQ, and social background of the husband and the wife in marriage, and 
which will be estimated from the patterns of sorting on these traits in equilibrium. With such a 
specification, it is possible to estimate how an additional year of schooling for a man or a woman 
affects the characteristics of his or her potential spouse, while controlling for the impacts of IQ 
and social background in the marriage market. In addition,    and    are random utility terms 
that captures the heterogeneity in preferences for marriage among men and women. These two 
random variables are independent across men and women, and normally distributed with 
parameters 
  ~    ,   
          ,             ,  
 
F. Marriage matching 
To model the formation of marriages between men and women, I use the matching framework of 
Crawford and Knoer (1981) which allows for an endogenous division of resources in marriage, 10 
 
also when utility is non-transferable. To maintain the structure of the chosen matching 
framework, I assume that there are a finite number of permitted allocations for each potential 
couple which differ in terms of how the resources available in marriage are divided between the 
husband and the wife.  
More formally, let  
Π 
 ,          , 
 ,  ,   , 
 ,     
   , 
 
be the set of   distinct pairs of utilities obtained from the consumption of commodities, which 
correspond to the permitted allocations for a potential couple   ,  . Since allocations in marriage 
are assumed to be efficient, each husband utility   , 
 ,   is the value of the Pareto problem (P) 
specified above given that the wife obtains utility   , 
 , .   
I order these allocations so that the sequence of utilities for the husband is strictly decreasing  
  , 
 ,      , 
 ,        , 
 ,   
and the sequence of utilities for the wife is strictly increasing. Figure 1 below illustrates three 
such pairs of utilities  
   ,            , ,   ,   
   , ,  
along the utility possibility frontier of a potential couple. 
To each of these permitted utilities from the consumption of commodities, one can add the utility 
of the marriage match itself for the husband and the wife, to obtain the set  
Π 
 ,          , 
 ,  ,   , 
 ,     
   ,  
of total permitted utilities in marriage. Ultimately, men and women care only about these total 
utilities when making decisions about if they should remain single or get married, and if so, with 
whom. However, the set of permitted allocations for a couple differ only in terms of the 
commodities that each of them receive, since the utility of the marriage match itself remains 
constant. 11 
 
A matching is defined as a specification of the men and women who are single, a one-to-one 
function   from the set of married men to the set of married women, such that if man   and 
woman   are married, then 
          ,                             ,      
and a division of utility 
   
 , ,   
 ,   Π  
 ,  
for every married couple   ,  .  
A matching is said to be individually rational, if there is no married agent that would prefer to be 
single. Moreover, a matching is said to be blocked by man   and woman  , if there is a permitted 
division of resources    
 , ,   
 ,   Π  ,  between them, such that they both weakly prefer 
marriage under the permitted division to the matching, and at least one of them strictly prefers 
marriage under the permitted division. Finally, if an individually rational matching is not blocked 
by any pair of man and woman, then it is said to be stable. 
In a framework such as the marriage model presented above, Crawford and Knoer (1981) prove 
that the set of stable matchings is non-empty. The proof proceeds by constructing an algorithm 
through which agents on one side of the market (men or women), propose to members of the 
opposite sex in stages by promising an allocation that delivers a given total utility to their 
potential future spouse. Every time an offer of marriage is rejected, the proposing party is forced 
to either raise his or her offer, propose to someone else, or remain single.  
As in the college admissions model of Gale and Shapley (1962), the matching model that is 
employed in this paper has multiple stable matchings. I select the unique matching which is 
obtained when men propose to women.   
 
G. Properties of the equilibrium 
For agents who end up being single, the solution to their time allocation problem (S) leads to a 
demand system in leisure, housework, and market work:  12 
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For married couples, analytical expressions for the solution to their time allocation problems are 
not available, as these allocations depend on the division of resources in marriage, which in turn 
is the endogenous outcome of the marriage matching process. To characterize the time 
allocations of married agents, I instead rely on the general properties of an efficient allocation.  
As is emphasized by the collective household literature, Pareto efficiency implies that the time 
allocation of a married couple can be thought of as if it was generated by a two-step process. 
First, the husband and the wife decide how much time they are each going to devote to 
housework, and thus, how much of the household good they will consume. Then, in a second 
stage, the couple divides the remaining resources between themselves and each household 
member chooses how to allocate his or her time between leisure and market work.  
Due to the separability of the household good from consumption and leisure, the second stage 
problem of the husband and the wife is given by 
         ·                ·                                              ,    
s.t)   ·         ·              
where     and    are the resources devoted to the husband and the wife respectively. Given the 
budget constraint of the couple, these two shares have to satisfy  
                       ·  1           ·  1      
The equilibrium shares    and    are complicated objects that depend on the observable and 
unobservable characteristics of all agents in a given market, and the distributions of the random 
utility terms for these agents. I do not specify a given functional form for these sharing rules as 13 
 
part of the structural model. Rather, I treat the shares for men and women as unobserved random 
variables, and estimate the parameters of the model through simulation.   
In the case of housework, the time inputs of husbands and wives can be characterized 
analytically when both of these household members supply time to market work. For such 
couples, efficiency in household production requires that the ratio of the marginal products of the 
housework of the husband and of the wife is proportional to the ratio of their wages: 
  
   
  
   




This result is reminiscent of the solution to the cost minimization problem of a firm, which 
chooses its inputs so that the marginal rate of technical substitution equals the ratio of factor 
prices. In the case of a household at an interior solution, the costs of the time inputs to 
housework are the wage rates of the husband and the wife. With the CES production function, 
this relationship can be used to obtain an expression for the optimal ratio of male to female 














   
 
Since the household production function is constant returns to scale, the ratio of the marginal 
products of housework is invariant to the scale of production, so that the quantity of the 
household good   drops out of the condition above. This makes it possible to identify the 
parameters of the household production function form data on inputs and factor costs alone (see 
Pollak and Wachter 1975).  
Turning finally to levels of housework, closed form solutions are once again available for 
couples in which both the husband and the wife supply time to market work. Conditional on  the 
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where   is the constant cost per unit of the household public good, which follows from the 
constant returns to scale assumption. The demand for the public good when both the husband and 
the work, is in turn 
   1      · 
1
 




To construct a set of marriage markets for men and women, I use cross-sectional data from the 
2000 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.  I limit myself to white men and 
women in the representative part of the survey, since marriages between whites and blacks in the 
US are very rare (see Wong 2003). For the group of white respondents, the median age 
difference between husbands and wives is 2 years. I therefore divide all male and female 
respondents in the NLSY into six different markets based on their birth year, so that men who 
were born in 1957 can marry women born in 1959, men born in 1958 can marry women born in 
1960, and so on. This gives a total of six cohort based marriage markets which are displayed in 
Table 1.  
For each of these six cohort marriage markets, I draw a total of 160 single or married men and 
women
2. To make sure that each of the six cohort samples is representative of the relevant 
population, I choose the number of single men, single women, and married couples in each 
market to match the sex ratio, and the ratio of singles to married agents in the 5% sample of the 




educational attainment of singles and married couples correspond to the distribution of these 
agents by educational attainment in the Census (more details about the sampling procedure can 
be found in Appendix A).  
The NLSY does contain flow variables for the non-labor income that each household member 
received in the year of 2000. Instead of using this variable, I compute a new non-labor income 
variable as a 10% earnings flow on the entire stock of wealth of each household, minus an 
imputed value of last year’s net savings. In the case of married couples, I then divide this non-
labor income stream so that husbands receive 60% of the non-labor income, and wives receive 
40%
3. After these imputations, the overall ratio of non-labor income to wage earnings is 25% for 
the agents in the six constructed NLSY cohort marriage markets. 
To construct a measure of each respondent’s social background, I use information about the 
education and occupation of the respondent’s parents. I first convert the variables on parental 
occupations into parental earnings by finding the mean annual earnings by gender for twelve 
specified occupational categories in the 1970 Census. I then estimate a single factor model and 
use it to reduce the four parental measurements on schooling and occupations (converted to 
earnings) into one “social background” index.  
 
B. ATUS 
The NLSY contains information about the time that men and women devote to market work, but 
no reliable information on the housework they perform. I therefore use the available variables on 
weeks and hours worked in the NLSY data to construct a measure of market work, and 
supplement the NLSY data with data from the 2003 American Time Use Survey (ATUS).   
In the ATUS surveys, a single member of a large number of US households is asked to fill in a 
time diary for the previous day. The information obtained from these diaries is then used to 
construct stylized measures of time use for each respondent based on a number of pre-specified 




weighting individual time diaries based on whether the diary was completed for a weekday, a 
Saturday, or a Sunday.  
The providers of the ATUS data divide all of the respondent time use into 17 major categories. 
Loosely speaking, I classify the sum of the activities referred to as household activities, caring 
for household and non-household members, consumer purchases, obtaining professional services, 
performing household services, obtaining government services, and making telephone calls 
related to housework, as housework (see Appendix B for the exact definition of the housework 
variable). I then compute the mean levels of housework for a set of different household types and 
used this data in the estimation process. Since the model I employ has agents with a unit 
endowment of time, I assume that there are 16 hours per day available for market work, 
housework, and leisure, and then treat the residual of the unit time endowment and the sum of 
market work and housework as leisure.  
 
IV. Identification 
The marriage matching model implies a set of reduced form equations for the time allocations of 
single agents. These equations together with data on time devoted to market work, leisure and 
housework, identify the preferences that men and women have over the market consumption 
good, leisure, and the public household good (this is not the only variation in the data that 
identifies the preferences of men and women over goods). The parameter   of the household 
production function, which determines the elasticity of substitution for male and female 
housework, is in turn identified by the efficiency condition for male and female housework in 
couples where both spouses are working.  
The parameters   ,    , and     which quantity the preferences that men and women have for 
marriage matches, are identified by the degree of sorting on these traits in marriage, as a larger 
parameter raises the extent to which these traits are direct complements.  The random utility 
terms    and   , are parameterized by their respective means and variances. The means are 
identified by the overall fraction of men and women who are married in equilibrium and by the 
observed market work of husbands and wives (which indicates how husbands and wives share 
their resources in marriage). The variance of the female marriage shock is normalized to 10 in 17 
 
the estimation procedure. With this normalization, the male variance term is then identified by 




A. Overview of method 
To estimate the marriage matching model, I rely on the method of simulated moments described 
in McFadden (1989), and Pakes and Pollard (1989). For a brief description of this estimation 
method, let   denote a vector of endogenous variables, let   denote a vector of exogenous 
variables, let   be a vector of   parameters to be estimated that appear in the conditional density 
   | ,   of   given  , and let    ,     be a random sample of     1,2,…,  observations from 
this density. Finally, let    , ,   be a vector of       moment functions with expectations 
given   equal to zero, if and only if the functions   are evaluated at the true parameter vector 
     . 
In the case of the marriage model that is estimated in this paper, the moment functions     , ,   
cannot be expressed analytically since they involve expectations that are analytically intractable. 
The method of simulated moments therefore proceeds by replacing such expectations with 
approximations that are formed as averages across a large number of Monte Carlo simulations 
with the statistical model.  
More formally, let      , ,   be the vector of   simulated moment functions, which have been 
formed by replacing intractable parts of the moment functions    , ,   with averages across    
Monte Carlo simulations. The simulated method of moments estimator        is then defined as  
                     
1
 
·         ,   ,  






·         ,   ,  
   , 
   
for some positive definite          weighting matrix Ω.  18 
 
Under mild regularity conditions, the  parameter estimates        obtained in this fashion are 
consistent as the square root of the number of observations √  divided by the number of 
simulations   , converges to zero (McFadden 1989, and Pakes and Pollard 1989). To perform the 
estimation in an efficient way, I first produced a consistent estimate of  the optimal weighting 
matrix, and then used this matrix in a second stage to obtain the final parameter estimates.  
 
B. Computation of equilibrium 
The structure of the estimated model does not rule out the possibility of corner allocations where 
one or both of the spouses in a married couple chooses not to work in the labor market. When I 
compute the stable matching of the marriage model, I therefore allow for corner allocations 
where married women choose not to devote any time to market work. Since middle age couples 
where only the wife is working are extremely rare though, I disregard efficient marriages which 
involve the husband not working in the labor market
4.  
For each potential couple, I allow for ten permitted allocations with a different division of 
resources between the husband and the wife. I also experimented with more permitted allocations 
per couple, but such a change had no impact on the result. I first compute the maximum utility 
that a wife can obtain in marriage while the husband receives at least his reservation utility. I 
then partition the interval of permitted offers from men to women so that these offers end up 
being spread with an equal dollar equivalent distance between them, over the interval from a 
woman’s reservation utility to the maximum utility that she can receive in marriage.  
To compute a stable matching in a market is time consuming because it involves solving a large  
number of numerical optimization problems for all conceivable couples (not only those that end 
up being married). I form simulated moments by generating      100 Monte Carlo simulations 
with the marriage model. More information about the details of these computations can be found 






C. Pre-estimation of wage equations 
In a first stage, I estimate the parameters of the male and female wage equations by pooling all 
observations that are available in the panel structure of the NLSY data. I add a set of region 
dummies and year dummies to the specification of the Mincer equations that were presented in 
the model section above, and estimate these equations with wage data for white men and women 
in the representative part of the NLSY data who are 30 years or older. The parameter estimates 
for years of schooling, IQ, and social background are also used to calibrate the effect of these 
traits on the housework productivity of men and women. 
For women, I first impute wages offers for married women who are not working by using the 
two-step method of Heckman (1974). I then run two separate OLS regressions on the set of all 
single and married men and women. The results from these two regressions are presented in 
Tables 2 and 3 below. As can be seen in these tables, men earn a return of about 6.4% on their 
investment in formal schooling in the labor market when controlling for social background and 
IQ scores, while the corresponding figure for women is 6.7%. 
Since the imputed log hourly wages in the NLSY data for men and women are likely to include 
big measurement error components, I follow Del Boca and Flinn (2006) and reduce the variance 
of log hourly wages by half in the estimation of the marriage model. The size of the reduction is 
motivated by the evidence from Bound, Duncan and Rodgers (1994), who compare self-reported 
and “true” hourly wages for factory workers and find that half of the variance of reported log 
hourly wages is due to measurement error.  
 
D. Moment conditions 
To estimate the remaining preference and production parameters of the model, I use moments 
based on time allocations and marital behavior. For market work and housework, I construct 
moments by separately comparing the observed and predicted allocations of time to these 
activities for single agents, married men, married working women, and married non-working 
women. I also include a moment for the fraction of men and women working. Finally, I include 
two orthogonality conditions for years of schooling and the difference between the observed and 20 
 
predicted levels of market work, and the observed and predicted labor market status of each 
agent.  
To capture the marital behavior of men and women in the estimated model, I include a moment 
for the overall fraction of men and women married. I also include an orthogonality condition for  
years of schooling and the difference between the observed and expected marital status of each 
agent. Finally, I include a set of moments that are based on the degree of sorting on years of 
schooling, AFQT scores, and social background in marriage. To that end, I introduce three 
functions (one for each of the traits mentioned above) that are equal to the product of the 
deviation of the wife’s trait from the mean, and the deviation of the husband’s trait from the 
mean if the agent is married, and equal to zero otherwise. I then form three moment conditions 
equal to the difference between the observed and predicted values of these three functions. In 
total, this gives me 15 moments that are used to estimate the remaining 13 parameters. 
 
VI. Results 
A. Overall estimation results 
All of the estimated preference and production parameters in the baseline specification are 
displayed in Table 4.  Under this specification, one year of schooling is assumed to raise the 
housework productivity of men and women by the same amount as it raises their labor market 
wages (by 6.55% which is the average of the estimated labor market returns of 6.4% and 6.7 % 
for men and women respectively and which appear in Tables 2 and 3). 
As can be seen in Table 4, the household production parameter   is estimated to be 0.61, which 
implies that the elasticity of substitution for male and female housework is in the order of 2.6. 
The estimated value of   also implies that a married couple produces  45% more of the 
household good than what the husband and the wife would do by themselves, if they supplied the 
same amount of time to housework as singles. This degree of complementarity for male and 
female housework is large, but does not appear to be unrealistic (see the robustness checks below 
for results with lower degrees of complementarity). 21 
 
Table 5 shows a summary of the observed levels of sorting in marriage. The observed 
correlations are based on data for white couples from the representative part of the 2000 NLSY 
data. As can be seen in the table, married couples sort positively on years of schooling, AFQT 
scores, social background, and hourly wages (see Appendix A for the imputation procedure that 
was used for AFQT scores and social background). The table also includes the predicted 
correlations for these traits from the estimated model which are very similar to the observed 
correlations.  
In Table 6, I display the observed time allocations for four different types of agents, which 
exhibit the well known pattern of specialization as a function of comparative advantage. Relative 
to single agents, husbands specialize towards market work and spend less time in housework. 
Wives on the other hand, spend less time in market work relative to single agents, and devote 
more time to housework. In the bottom part of Table 6, I also display the predicted patterns of 
time allocations from the model. These predictions exhibit the same type of specialization that 
can be observed in the data.  
In Figures 2 and 3, I show the observed and predicted fractions of women and men who are 
married as a function of their years of schooling. In the data, more schooling raises marriage 
rates for both men and women, and these overall patterns are replicated by the model. In Figure 4, 
I compare the fraction of married women who are working in the data and in the model by years 
of schooling. Overall in the data, 71% percent of married women are working while the 
corresponding fraction in the model is 75% percent. However, the rate at which the labor force 
participation of women grows by years of schooling is too low in the model. Figures 5 to 7 
finally, display the fraction of time that working married women, married men, and singles 
devote to market work. The model predicts a level of market work for all these agents that is 
close to the levels observed in the data. 
 
B. Counterfactuals 
To quantify marriage returns to schooling, I use the estimated marriage matching model to 
evaluate what the counterfactual marital outcome would have been for a man or woman, if he or 
she had obtained an additional year of schooling. This counterfactual marital outcome involves 22 
 
the probability that he or she would be married, the characteristics of his or her spouse if married, 
and the fraction of resources that he or she would obtain in such a potential marriage.  
To implement these counterfactuals, I introduce an additional man and woman in each cohort 
marriage market
5. I then vary the years of schooling of the additional agents one at a time, and 
record their consumption outcomes across a large number of simulations. In these simulations, I 
keep the non-labor income, AFQT scores, and social background of the additional agents fixed. 
However, I adjust their wages and productivity in housework in accordance with their assigned 
years of schooling, and the parameters of the estimated Mincer equations.  
To illustrate how the counterfactuals are performed, I consider the case of a man who increases 
his schooling from    to    years. I first simulate the model   times at both these levels of 
schooling for the man, record his utility from the consumption of the market good, leisure, and 
the household good in each simulation, and form the mean utilities    and    for him across 
these two sets of simulations  
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I then perform a third set of simulations in which I assign the man    years of schooling and 
increase his wage and housework productivity in accordance with the new level of schooling, but 
hold the quality of his marital outcome fixed.  In the case where the man was single with    
years of schooling, I simply record the utility of the man as single with a higher wage and an 
increased level of productivity in housework. In the case where the man ended up being married 
with    years of schooling, I construct a new intermediate marriage for him in which he has    
years of schooling, receives a higher wage and is more productive in housework, but remains 
married to the same wife as when he had    years of schooling.  
In this new intermediate marriage, I divide the available resources between the man and his wife 
so that the wife receives the same utility as in the original marriage when the man had    years of 
schooling. Such a division of resources in the intermediate marriage is consistent with the 





accordance with their marginal contributions to marital output (see for example Iyigun and 
Walsh 2007)
 6. Formally speaking, the model used in this paper does have a finite number of 
agents, but the number of agents is very large and the division of resources is endogenized to 
mimic the outcomes of a large marriage market in which men and women compete over spouses.  
This procedure for married couples is illustrated in Figure 8, in which the original marriage of 
the man when he has    years of schooling is represented with the point    along the utility 
possibility frontier      . The figure also includes the counterfactual marriage for the man when 
he has    years of schooling, which is represented by the point    along the utility possibility 
frontier      .  Finally, the figure contains the intermediate marriage which is illustrated by the 
point    along the intermediate utility possibility frontier     . Notice how the wife in the 
intermediate marriage represented by the point    receives the same utility as in the original 
marriage represented by the point   .    
With this complete set of intermediate outcomes for the man, I can form his mean utility from 
the consumption of the market good, leisure, and the household good across all intermediate 
simulations as 
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If Λ    is the inverse of the expenditure function that converts utilities into dollars, then the total 
difference in the dollar value of consumption for the man at the two levels of schooling can be 
expressed as Λ uB   Λ  uA . Similarly, the consumption difference for the man that is due to 
improvements in his marital outcomes is Λ uB   Λ  uI . I therefore compute the share of returns 
to schooling for the man that is realized through marriage as  
       
Λ      Λ  uI 







The counterfactual described above gives me an estimate of the importance of marital 
improvements for one man in one cohort market, as he increases his schooling from    to    
years. I repeat this counterfactual for all the additional men and women in the model, and change 
their educational attainment in increments of one year of schooling, from 10 to 11, 11 to 12, and 
so on, up to 17 to 18 years of schooling. In Figure 9, I display the distribution of all these shares 
for men, and in Figure 10, I display the corresponding distribution for women. Finally, I take the 
median
7 of all these estimates and use it to summarize my results. In the case of men, the median 
is 29% and for women, the median is 28%.  
 
C. Robustness Checks 
The overall results presented above were obtained under the assumption that one year of 
schooling raises the productivity of men and women in housework at the same rate as it raises 
their labor market wages. Some economists however, have estimated and argued that the return 
to schooling in housework is lower than the return in the labor market (see Grossman 2006 for a 
survey of the literature on non-market returns to schooling). I therefore conducted robustness 
checks in which I lowered the effect of schooling on housework productivity to 5% and 3% 
respectively. To obtain these new results, I recalibrated the model, estimated it again, and then 
performed new counterfactual experiments with the model at the new parameter values. 
In table 7, I report the results of these robustness checks together with the baseline results. The 
second and third rows of the table indicate that lowering the effect of schooling on housework 
productivity does raise the estimated shares of marriage returns to schooling a little bit, but the 
shares never exceed 40%. In that sense, variations in the effect of schooling on housework 
productivity has a fairly small effect on the overall results of the paper. 
As mentioned above, the estimates of the elasticity of substitution in housework together with 
the choices of household production functions for married and single agents, implies that a 
married couple produces 45% more of the household good than what the husband and the wife 




size of the surplus follows from an estimated parameter, but also depends on the particular 
functional forms that were used to quantify the household production process. To minimize the 
impact of these functional form assumptions, I therefore performed a second set of robustness 
checks in which I vary the surplus of married agents in household production relative to their 
single counterparts.  
To that end, I consider a slightly generalized CES household production function for married 
agents  




     ,     1 
with an extra multiplicative productivity term  . Instead of setting   equal to one as above in the 
baseline specification, I also consider specifications in which    is equal to 0.85 and 0.70. With 
such alternative specifications, it is no longer true that  a married couple in which only one of the 
household members devotes time to housework, produces the same quantity of the household 
good as that household member would have produced, had he or she lived alone as a single agent. 
On the other hand, it is possible to consider how different assumptions about the direct 
complementarities of male and female housework in marriage affect the overall estimated share 
of marriage returns to schooling. In particular, the two values for   imply that a married couple 
now produces 25% and 5% more of the household good than what the husband and the wife 
would do by themselves, if they supplied the same amount of time to housework as singles. 
For this second set of robustness checks, I once again recalibrated the model, estimated it again, 
and then performed new counterfactual experiments with the model at the new parameter values. 
As the two bottom rows of Table 7 indicates, these changes once again have a very small impact 
on the overall results.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper, I quantified the share of returns to schooling that middle aged US men and women 
are currently realizing through marriage. Such marriage returns were defined as the additional 
material resources that more educated men and women can acquire through marriage. For that 26 
 
purpose, I embedded a collective household model (Chiappori 1988) within the matching 
framework of Crawford and Knoer (1981). The model was then estimated from data on the 
relationship between schooling and wage rates, the division of time within the household, and the 
extent to which men and women sort positively on several traits in marriage.  
To quantify marriage returns to schooling with the estimated marriage matching model, I 
addressed the counterfactual question of what the marital outcome would have been for men and 
women in the sample, if they had obtained an additional year of schooling. The overall results 
suggest that US middle aged men and women are currently realizing in the order of 30% of their 
returns to schooling through marriage. 
Given these large marriage returns, human capital theory predicts that men and women should 
partly make their schooling choices on the basis of how their future marriage prospects are 
affected. Two recent empirical papers provide evidence consistent with such behavior. The first 
is the study by Charles and Luoh (2009), who examine how the incarceration of black males has 
affected black women in the US.  Using variations in the incarceration rates across states, the 
authors find that black women in communities with fewer men respond to such changes in the 
sex ratio by increasing their investments in schooling.  
A second similar study is that of Lafortune (2010) who analyzes the schooling choices of second 
generation US immigrants born around 1900. Because many of these second generation 
immigrants married within their own ethnic groups, the sex ratios they faced in marriage 
depended on the gender composition of new arriving immigrants to the US. As for black women, 
Lafortune finds that men who faced increasing competition in marriage from newly arriving 







Appendix A. Cohort Data from the NLSY 
 
To construct separate markets with men and women who can remain single, or marry a member 
of the opposite sex, I use 2000 data on white respondents from the representative part of the 
NLSY. The agents who appear in the marriage markets are all respondents in the original NLSY 
data set, but I also use data for their spouses to construct some moments used in the estimation 
process.  
For the respondents, all the required data is available, except for data on their housework. The 
AFQT scores used in this paper are the cohort and gender adjusted percentiles of the raw total 
test scores. For social background, I estimate a single principal factor model with the data that is 
available on the years of schooling of the respondent’s father and mother, and the earnings of 
these two parents (imputed from their occupations) which I denote by   in the text above.   
For the spouses of the respondents, there is no information on AFQT scores and social 
background. I therefore impute values for these two variables by forming cells based on the 
education, gender, occupation, and spouse education of all the respondents in the representative 
part of the NLSY survey. In the imputation, I use both the mean and the variance of these traits 
for each cell.  
To make sure that each cohort sample is representative of the overall US population, I compute 
sex ratios, fractions of men and women married, and the educational distribution of the entire 
cohort of white men and women in the 5% sample of the 2000 Census. Each separate cohort 
based marriage market is then constructed by drawing a number of single and married men and 
women to replicate these summary statistics. 
Single agents and married men were included in the constructed sample if they worked last year. 
Married women were included regardless of their labor force status. All the included men and 
women in the constructed data set were either single agents who lived alone, or married agents 
(no cohabiting men and women were included). 
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Appendix B. Activities from the ATUS Included in the Housework Measure 
 
Time use category  Activities included in housework 
01 None 
02 All  activities 
03  All activities except 030103, 030104, 030105, and 030110 
04  All activities except 040103, 040104, 040105, and 040110 
05 None 
06 None 
07 All  activities 
08  080101, 080102, 080201-080203, 080299, 080301, 080302, 
080601, 080602, 080701, 080702, and half of 089999 
09 All  activities 






16  160103, 160108, and half of 169999 
17  All traveling related to the housework activities above 
     
Note. A list of the 17 pre-specified categories in the ATUS time use survey, and the activities 
that I include in the housework measure. The exact definitions of all of these  activities can 






Appendix C. Computation of Equilibrium 
The equilibrium of the model was computed through the following steps: 
1) The utility of being single was computed for all men and women. 
2) The maximum utility that a woman could obtain in every marriage while the husband received 
his reservation utility as single was computed. Both allocations where the wife did and did not 
work were considered.  
3) The maximum utility that a man could obtain in every marriage while the wife received her 
reservation utility as single was computed. Both allocations where the wife did and did not work 
were considered.  
4) For marriages with a surplus, the interval between the highest obtainable utility for the wife 
and her reservation utility as single, was partitioned with 10 equispaced points in dollar 
equivalent terms. 
5) For each of these ten utility values, the maximum utility that could be obtained by the husband 
was computed as the maximum over allocations where the wife did and did not work. 
6) The matching algorithm from Crawford and Knoer (1981) was applied to the men and women 
in a given market and the values along the utility possibility frontier that were computed in the 
five steps above. 
If the non-negativity constraint for male market work was binding in a couple, then a marriage 
between the husband and the wife was ruled out, that is, I discarded efficient allocations in which 
only the wife would have supplied time to market work. Such allocations appeared in less than 2% 
of all potential marriages in the model at the estimated parameters. 
To experiment with the model, I also computed stable matchings when the utility possibility 
frontier of a couple was split into 20 and 30 allocations respectively. This had no impact on the 
results. To minimize the computational time, I therefore estimated the model with only 10 






Baker, Matthew J., and Joyce P. Jacobsen. 2007. Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender 
Division of Labor, Journal of Labor Economics 25, no. 4: 763-793.  
Becker, Gary S. 1960. Investing in Education and Research: Underinvestment in College 
Education?, American Economic Review 50, no. 2: 346-354. 
Becker, Gary S., and Nigel Tomes. 1986. Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families, 
Journal of Labor Economics 4, no. 3: S1-S39. 
Bound, John, Charles Brown, Greg Duncan, and Willard Rodgers. 1994. Evidence on the 
Validity of Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Labor Market Data, Journal of Labor Economics 
12(3): 345-68. 
Charles, Kerwin K., and Ming C. Luoh. Forthcoming. Male Incarceration, the Marriage Market, 
and Female Outcomes, The Review of Economics and Statistics. 
Chiappori, Pierre-André. 1988. Rational Household Labor Supply, Econometrica 56, no. 1: 63-
90. 
Chiappori, Pierre-André., Bernard Fortin, and Guy Lacroix. 2002. Marriage Market, Divorce 
Legislation, and Household Labor Supply, Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 1: 37-72. 
Chiappori, Pierre-André, Murat Iyigun, and Yoram Weiss. 2009. Investments in Schooling and 
the Marriage Market, American Economic Review 99, no. 5: 1689-1713. 
Choo, Eugene, and Aloysius Siow. 2006. Who Marries Whom and Why? Journal of Political 
Economy 114, no. 1: 175-201. 
Choo, Eugene, Shannon Seitz, and Aloysius Siow. 2008. The Collective Marriage Matching 
Model: Identification, Estimation, and Testing, Working Paper no. 704, Boston College, 
Department of Economics, Boston. 
Cole, Harold L., George J. Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite. 2001. Efficient Non-Contractible 
Investments in Large Economies, Journal of Economic Theory 101: 333-373. 
Crawford, Vincent P., and Elsie M. Knoer. 1981. Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and 
Workers, Econometrica 49, no. 2: 437-450. 
Del Boca, Daniela, and Christopher J. Flinn. 2006. Household Time Allocation and Modes of 
Behavior: A Theory of Sorts, IZA Discussion Papers 1821, Bonn. 
Ermisch, John, Marco Francesconi, and Thomas Siedler. 2006, Intergenerational Mobility and 
Marital Sorting, Economic Journal 116 (July): 659-679. 
Gale, David, and Loyd Shapley. 1962. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, 
American Mathematical Monthly 69: 9-15. 31 
 
Goldin, Claudia. 1992. The Meaning of College in the Lives of American Women: The Past 
Hundred Years, Working Paper no. 4099, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Goldin, Claudia, Lawrence Katz, and Ilyana Kuziemko, 2006. The Homecoming of American 
College Women: A Reversal of the College Gender Gap, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, 
no. 4: 133-56. 
Grossman, Michael. 2006. Education and Nonmarket Outcomes, In Handbook of the Economics 
of Education, ed. Eric Hanushek and Finis Welch. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland. 
Hadfield, Gillian K. 1999. A Coordination Model of the Sexual Division of Labor, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 40, no. 2: 125-153. 
Heckman, James. 1974. Shadow Prices, Market Wages, and Labor Supply, Econometrica 42, no. 
4: 679-694.  
Iyigun, Murat, and Randall P. Walsh. 2007. Building the Family Nest: Pre-Marital Investments, 
Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations, Review of Economic Studies 74, no. 2: 507-35. 
Lafortune, Jeanne. 2010. Making Yourself Attractive: Pre-Marital Investments and the Returns 
to Education in the Marriage Market, Unpublished Manuscript, Department of Economics, 
University of Maryland, College Park. 
Lefgren, Lars and Frank McIntyre. 2006.  Examining the Relationship between Women’s 
Education and Marriage Outcomes , Journal of Labor Economics 24, no. 4: 787-830.  
McFadden, Daniel. 1989. A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response 
Models without Numerical Integration, Econometrica 57, no. 5: 995-1026. 
Pakes, Ariel, and David Pollard. 1989. Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization 
Estimators, Econometrica 57, no. 5: 1027-1057. 
Peters, Michael, and Aloysius Siow. 2002. Competing Premarital Investments, Journal of 
Political Economy 110, no. 3: 592-608. 
Pollak, Robert A., and Michael L. Wachter. 1975. The Relevance of the Household Production 
Function and Its Implications for the Allocation of Time, Journal of Political Economy 83, no. 2: 
255-277. 
Wong, Linda. 2003. Why Do Only 5.5% of Black Men Marry White Women? International 













                                 Table 1: Cohort Based Marriage Markets in the NLSY Data 
Market  Male cohort  Female cohort  Male age  Female age  # Men  # Women 
                    
1  1957 1959  43  41  79  81 
2  1958 1960  42  40  79  81 
3  1959 1961  41  39  79  81 
4  1960 1962  40  38  81  79 
5  1961 1963  39  37  81  79 
6  1962 1964  38  36  81  79 
                    












                         Table 2: Male Wage Equation 
Dependent Variable  Log male wages 
Years of schooling  0.064 
(0.003) 
Social background 0.069 
(0.008) 




Experience squared  -0.001 
(2.5E-0.4) 
North East Region  0.095 
(0.017) 
North Central Region  -0.029 
(0.015) 




Year dummies 1988-2002 
     
# Observations  12598 
R-squared 0.22 
     
Note. Regression of log male wages on male characteristics with  
pooled data over period of 1988 to 2002. Numbers in parentheses  




                        Table 3. Female Wage Equation 
Dependent variable  Log female wages 
     
Years of schooling  0.067 
(0.001) 
Social background  0.022 
(0.004) 




Experience squared  -0.001 
(8.3E-05) 
North East Region  0.076 
(0.008) 
North Central Region  -0.111 
(0.007) 




Year dummies 1988-2002 
     
# Observations  15069 
R-squared 0.66 
     
Note. Second stage regression of log female wages on female  
characteristics with pooled data over period of 1988 to 2002.  









                              Table 4: Estimated Parameters 
Preferences over goods       
φ  weight for consumption  0.495  (0.258) 
δ  weight for leisure  0.323  (0.310) 
sc subsistence  consumption -3.38  (3.45) 
sl subsistence  leisure  -0.0108  (0.488) 
sq  subsistence household good  -0.148  (0.230) 
Household technology       
ν  exponent in CES technology  0.612  (0.0699) 
π  standard error housework shock  0.261  (0.318) 
Preferences over matches       
τs schooling  5.74x10-4 (0.0196) 
τIQ IQ  0.0151  (0.0355) 
τθ social  background  1.75x10-3 (0.0405) 
μm mean  marriage  shock  men  -0.367  (0.194) 
μf mean  marriage  shock  women  5.33  (1.51) 
σm  standard error marriage shock men  0.247  (0.0696) 
           













               Table 5: Observed and Predicted Levels of Sorting 
   Observed Correlation     Predicted Correlation 
Years of Schooling  0,55   0,61  
Hourly Wages  0,33   0,34  
AFQT scores  0,35   0,44  
Social Background  0,24   0,32  
Non-Labor Income  n.a.  0,096 
Note. The observed levels of sorting were computed with observations on all  
















                           Table 6: Observed and Predicted Time Allocations 
   Market Work     Housework     Leisure 
Observed Time Allocations                
Singles 0.43  0.21  0.46 
Husbands   0.46  0.13  0.41 
Working wives  0.29  0.35  0.36 
Non-working wives  0  0.56  0.44 
Predicted Time Allocations                
Singles 0.38  0.22  0.40 
Husbands   0.43  0.18  0.39 
Working wives  0.32  0.32  0.36 
Non-working wives  0  0.45  0.55 
Note. Figures refer to fraction of total time spent in the three activities of market work 














      Table 7: Estimated Marriage Returns to Schooling 
   Men     Women 
Baseline case  29%  28% 
Gamma equals 5%  31%  31% 
Gamma equals 3%  29%  39% 
A equals 0.85  29%  28% 
A equals 0.70  28%  29% 
Note. Percentages refer to share of total returns to schooling that  
men and women realize through marriage. Baseline case is when 
return to schooling in housework equals the return to schooling in  
the labor market. Rows with alternative gammas refer to  
specifications in which the return to schooling in housework is  
lowered (to 5% and 3%). Finally, changes in the parameter A 
refer to variatons in the degree of complementarity between  








Figure 1: Stylized Utility Possibility Frontier for a Married Couple 
 










Note. Three permitted divisions of utility along a stylized utility possibility frontier of a married couple. The utility 
of the husband is plotted along the y-axis, and the utility of the wife is plotted along the x-axis. Only the part of the 
frontier above the reservation utilities of the husband and the wife (their utilities if they choose to remain single) is 
plotted since no marriages will takes place below these two levels. 
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Note. Fraction married women by years of schooling in the model and in the data. The model outcome is the average 
over one hundred simulations with the model economy evaluated at the estimated parameters. The data sample 
consists of all the white women between the ages of 36 and 41 in the representative part of the2000 survey of the 

























Note. Fraction married men by years of schooling in the model and in the data. The model outcome is the average 
over one hundred simulations with the model economy evaluated at the estimated parameters. The data sample 
consists of all the white men between the ages of 38 and 43 in the representative part of the2000 survey of the 

























Note. Fraction married women working by years of schooling in the model and in the data. The model outcome is 
the average over one hundred simulations with the model economy evaluated at the estimated parameters. The data 
sample consists of all the married white women between the ages of 36 and 41 in the representative part of the2000 


























Note. Fraction of time married working women devote to market work in the model and in the data. The model 
outcome is the average over one hundred simulations with the model economy evaluated at the estimated parameters. 
The data sample consists of all the white working married women between the ages of 36 and 41 in the 
representative part of the2000 survey of the NLSY79 (a total of 895 observations). In the data, a day was assumed to 
consist of 14 hours available for market work, leisure, and housework. The fraction represented in the figure is the 
























Note. Fraction of time married men devote to market work in the model and in the data. The model outcome is the 
average over one hundred simulations with the model economy evaluated at the estimated parameters. The data 
sample consists of all the white working married men between the ages of 38 and 43 in the representative part of 
the2000 survey of the NLSY79 (a total of 888 observations). In the data, a day was assumed to consist of 14 hours 
available for market work, leisure, and housework. The fraction represented in the figure is the ratio of the total 






















Note. Fraction of time single agents devote to market work in the model and in the data. The model outcome is the 
average over one hundred simulations with the model economy evaluated at the estimated parameters. The data 
sample consists of all the white working singles between the ages of 36 and 43 in the representative part of the2000 
survey of the NLSY79 (a total of 790 observations). In the data, a day was assumed to consist of 14 hours available 
for market work, leisure, and housework. The fraction represented in the figure is the ratio of the total hours worked 



















Figure 8. Actual and Counterfactual Marital Outcomes 
 
 
Note. The simulated allocations    and    correspond to allocations for a married man at two different 
levels of schooling. The intermediate marital outcome   would be realized if the man obtained the higher 
years of schooling, but still married the same wife as in the allocation   . In the counterfactual simulations, 
the position of the intermediate allocation    along the utility possibility frontier      is chosen so that the 






























Note. Histogram for the share of male returns to schooling that are earned through marriage. Distribution is 
taken over all simulations across six different cohort based marriage markets, and 8 different one year 
increments of schooling (10 to 11, 11 to 12, and so on, up to 17 to 18 years of schooling). The median across all 












Note. Histogram for the share of female returns to schooling that are earned through marriage. Distribution is 
taken over all simulations across six different cohort based marriage markets, and 8 different one year 
increments of schooling (10 to 11, 11 to 12, and so on, up to 17 to 18 years of schooling). The median across all 
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